We investigate new models and constructions which allow leakage-resilient signatures secure against existential forgeries, where the signature is much shorter than the leakage bound. Current models of leakage-resilient signatures against existential forgeries demand that the adversary cannot produce a new valid message/signature pair (m, σ) even after receiving some λ bits of leakage on the signing key. If |σ| ≤ λ, then the adversary can just choose to leak a valid signature σ, and hence signatures must be larger than the allowed leakage, which is impractical as the goal often is to have large signing keys to allow a lot of leakage.
Introduction
The problem of message authentication is one of the most basic in cryptography. Alice wants to transmit a message m to Bob via an insecure channel, with the guarantee that the message will reach the destination without any modification by a third party on the communication channel. In a world where public-key cryptography exists the latter can be achieved via a digital signature: Before sending m, Alice computes a signature σ (via her signing key sk ) of the message, and transmits (m, σ) over the channel. The idea is that Bob can later verify the signature using Alice's verification key vk , and thus establish whether the received message is consistent with the original. 1 Traditionally, security of signatures schemes (and other cryptographic primitives) is modeled in a black-box fashion where an adversary can only access the algorithms underlying the scheme as a blackbox. For instance, in the case of a signature scheme, we require that no computationally bounded adversary is able to forge a signature of a message (with respect to some verification key vk ) even given black-box access to an oracle returning signatures of arbitrarily chosen messages (computed via the signing key corresponding to vk ). 2 However, as pointed out by recent research, the model above might be too restrictive, in that in practice there are several ways by which an adversary can learn partial information (a.k.a. leakage) on the secrets used within a cryptographic primitive, and thus easily step out of the security model. This includes so-called side-channel attacks, based on timings [28] , power analysis [29] and electromagnetic radiation [36] .
A large body of work has extended standard cryptographic definitions such that they can capture different flavours of security against leakage, both in the game-based setting (e.g. [14, 34, 1, 31, 25, 15, 9, 11, 12, 6] ) and in the simulation-based setting [18, 22, 4, 32] . In the case of a signature scheme, a simple extension of the black-box setting requires that no computationally bounded adversary is able to forge a signature of a message (with respect to some verification key vk ) even given black-box access to an oracle returning signatures on arbitrarily chosen messages (computed via the signing key corresponding to vk ) and to a leakage oracle returning bounded (but otherwise arbitrary) information on the signing key sk . This is often referred to as the bounded leakage model, and on this we focus our work. See Section 1.2 for a discussion on other models.
The modeling above requires two necessary limitations. The first limitation is that the total amount of leakage must be smaller than the length of the signing key, as otherwise the entire key can be learned by the adversary, leaving no hope for security. The second limitation is that a signature has to be longer than the leakage bound, as otherwise a leakage query can just leak a forgery which is a valid attack against the security definition. A similar issue was already observed by Alwen, Dodis and Wichs [1] , in their work on leakage-resilient public-key cryptography in the so-called bounded retrieval model. In this setting, the secret key is made intentionally large (say, 100 gigabytes) such that it may be infeasible/impractical for the attacker to download "too much" data (say, more than 1 gigabytes). Still, the length of the public key and the computational overhead are essentially independent from the size of the secret key. For the very same reason pointed out above, no signature scheme can be proven existentially unforgeable in the bounded retrieval model, as the leakage could simply consist of a forgery. To tackle this issue the authors in [1] considered a weaker notion, which they name entropic unforgeability, where, after the leakage phase, the adversary is required to forge the signature of a message sampled from a (potentially adversarially chosen) distribution of high enough min-entropy (given the entire view of the adversary). [1] then shows that entropic unforgeability can be achieved in the random oracle model [3] , by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform [17] to a certain class of interactive protocols.
In this work we propose more granular ways to model (bounded) leakage resilience for signature schemes where the length of the signature is smaller than the length of the secret key. In a nutshell, our simplest notion says that an adversary leaking λ bits will always be able to produce λ/|σ| forgeries, but not more than that. At first glance it may seem that our notion gives a weaker guarantee. However, the number of forgeries the adversary is required to produce strictly depends on the actual leakage, so if an adversary asks for no leakage (i.e. we are in the black-box model), our notion is equivalent to standard existential unforgeability, as now λ/|σ| = 0. On the other hand, when leakage does happen, our definition offers a graceful degradation of security and, as we argue in more details below, still allows for interesting, non-trivial, applications.
Our Contribution
We investigate new models and constructions which allow leakage-resilient signatures secure against existential forgeries, where the signature is much shorter than the leakage bound. Our main contributions are discussed in detail below.
One-more unforgeability. As a first contribution, we state another flavour of leakage resilience for signature schemes where the length of the secret key is much larger than the length of a signature. 3 We name our notion one-more unforgeability, since it has a similar flavour to the unforgeability notion for blind signatures [35] . The attacker (given the verification key vk ) can access a signing oracle and a leakage oracle; at the end he has to output n forgeries (m 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , (m n , σ n ) and wins the game if and only if all the forgeries are valid, the messages are pairwise distinct, and n is strictly larger than the number of forgeries one could have leaked via leakage queries. See Section 3 for a precise definition.
We also formulate a seemingly stronger variant of the above definition, which we name constrainedone-more unforgeability. Here we introduce a simulator S which first looks at the state of the adversary A after the leakage phase ended and then defines a set of messages Q * of size strictly smaller than n, as defined above. A signature scheme is secure in this setting if, for every adversary A, there exists such a simulator for which A is not able to forge a message which is not contained in Q * (and which was not already asked to the signing oracle). This captures the intuition that the forgeries are already fixed after the leakage is ended, and the adversary is "constrained" in the sense that those are the only messages for which he can forge. 4 We show that one-more unforgeability and constrained-one-more unforgeability are equivalent. The more involved direction is to show that one-more-unforgeability implies constrained-one-more unforgeability. The intuition is using an adversary breaking constrained-one-more unforgeability and rewinding him to obtain a sufficiently large set of forgeries: if at each rewinding we use a strictly larger set Q * 3 Note that this in general encompasses schemes with short signatures, and not necessarily signature schemes in the bounded retrieval model. 4 We note that constrained-one-more unforgeability is strictly stronger than entropic unforgeability [1] . If a scheme is constrained-one-more unforgeable, then after the leakage is done, a poly-sized set of messages Q * is defined and the adversary cannot forge for a message outside Q * , whereas a high entropy message will hit inside Q * with negligible probability. On the other hand consider a signature scheme where a signature is given as σ = Π −1 (m) for a one-way trapdoor permutation Π hard to invert on high-entropy m. Such a scheme is entropic secure in the presence of λ = 0 bits of leakage, by definition, but is clearly not constrained-one-more unforgeable in the presence of λ = 0 bits of leakage, as the adversary can always sample one more random message/signature pair as m = Π(σ) for random σ.
(including all previous forgeries output by the adversary), after n steps we end-up with n forgeries which allow to break one-more unforgeability. The actual analysis is more involved, as we need to take care of the fact that we are rewinding the adversary at the point where he is already committed to the leakage.
A construction. As a second contribution, we present a scheme achieving one-more-unforgeability. The construction is based on a perfectly hiding (homomorphic) commitment scheme and a non-interactive zero knowledge argument of knowledge system.
The secret key consists of the coefficients δ i of a d-degree polynomial δ(·) over a finite field, together with the openings r i for the commitments com i to the same coefficients. The verification key consists of the set of all com i together with a common reference string for the argument system. To sign a message m, we compute δ(m) and we produce a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge that the evaluation of the polynomial was performed correctly using the coefficients whose commitments are in the verification key. The signature consists of such an argument.
We prove that the scheme is one-more unforgeable whenever the commitment is perfectly hiding (and computationally binding), as long as the leakage is smaller than (1/2 − o(1)) · |sk |. We also show a particular instantiation, using standard building blocks such as Pedersen commitments [33] and GrothSahai proofs [20, 21] . Security follows from the DLIN assumption [5] . We remark that for our concrete instantiation it is indeed the case that the length of a signature is essentially independent of the length of the secret key.
Application to identification protocols. Besides being a notion of theoretical interest, we also show that one-more unforgeability can be applied in the context of identification protocols. We focus on the public-key setting, where a prover P wants to be identified from a verifier V holding P's public key.
Following [1] , we define security in the presence of leakage by considering an adversary having black-box access to the prover and to a leakage oracle (depending on the prover's secret key) in a first phase. In a second phase the adversary is given one chance to convince the verifier. The above notion is reminiscent of so-called active security [24, 26] .
We show that the classical protocol for public-key identification, where the verifier challenges the prover with a random message and the prover has to respond with a signature on that message, achieves the above notion of active security 5 with leakage, provided that the underlying signature scheme is constrained-one-more unforgeable.
Other Related Work
In this work (similarly to [1, 11, 16] ) we focus on bounded leakage resilience, i.e., we assume that there is an a-priori upper bound on the length of the maximum tolerated leakage. Furthermore, we consider a setting where the leakage can only depend on the signing key and not on the full state of the signer (including, e.g., the signer's random coins). A strictly stronger notion of fully leakage-resilient signatures (where the leakage is bounded but can depend on the entire state of the signer) was considered in [25, 6, 8] .
In the continual leakage setting [7, 10, 30, 6] , there is no a priori bound on the length of the leakage. This requires an efficient procedure to update the secret key (while leaving the public key unchanged), and to assume that the leakage is bounded only between two updates (and during the update process itself).
An independent line of research (see, e.g. [23, 27] ) aims at constructing signature schemes (in the black-box model) which are as short as possible. Even though this is not our purpose, we believe that our notions could have interesting implications in this setting, when studying leakage resilience of such schemes.
Preliminaries 2.1 Notation
For a, b ∈ R, we let [a, b] = {x ∈ R ; a ≤ x ≤ b}; for a ∈ N we let [a] = {1, 2, . . . , a}. If x is a string, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x ← X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input x, r ∈ {0, 1} * the computation of A(x; r) terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
Throughout the paper we let κ denote the security parameter. We say that a function ν : N → R is negligible in the security parameter κ if ν(κ) = κ −ω(1) . For two ensembles X = {X κ } κ∈N and Y = {Y κ } κ∈N , we write X ≡ Y if they are identically distributed and X ≈ s Y to denote that the statistical distance between the two distributions is negligible in the security parameter. We say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if for all PPT distinguishers
The min-entropy of a random variable X over a set X is defined as H ∞ (X) := − log max x P [X = x] and represents the best chance of guessing X by an unbounded adversary. Average min-entropy captures how hard it is to guess X on average, given some side information Z (possibly related to X):
The min-entropy of a distribution conditioned to some side information cannot decrease more than the bit-length of the side information itself:
). For all random variables X ∈ X and Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ we have that
We let O (s) be an oracle parametrized by a value s, which takes as input efficiently computable functions f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * and outputs f (s), returning a total of at most bits.
Commitment Schemes
A (non-interactive) commitment scheme COM is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, Commit), defined as follows: (1) Algorithm Setup takes as input the security parameter and outputs a public key pk ; (2) Algorithm Commit takes as input a message m ∈ M, randomness r ∈ R, the public key pk and outputs a value com ∈ C. To open a commitment com we output (m, r); an opening is valid if and only if com = Commit(m; r).
A commitment scheme has two properties, known as binding and hiding. In Section 4 we need a scheme with the following flavour.
Computationally Binding : For any PPT adversary A, the following is negligible:
Statistically Hiding : For all messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, we have that
where the two ensembles are considered as random variables over the choice of the randomness to generate pk ← Setup(1 κ ) and to compute the commitment. If the two ensembles are identically distributed, we say that the commitment is perfectly hiding.
Whenever M and R are a finite field F, we say that COM is linearly homomorphic in the following sense: Given commitments com and com and a field element c ∈ F, one can compute commitments com * and com such that being able to open com and com to m and m (respectively) allows to open com * to m + m and com to c · m. We will write the mapping (com, com ) → com * as com · com and the mapping (c, com) → com as com c . Similarly, for the opening information we will write the mappings as com * = Commit(pk , m + m ; r + r ) and com = Commit(pk , c · m; c · r). The above can be generalized to abstract operations over the spaces M, R and C, but for simplicity, and to be consistent with the concrete instantiation given in Section 4.2, we stick to the above formulation here.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
For a relation R ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , the language associated with R is L R = {x : ∃w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R}. A non-interactive argument system N IZK for a relation R is a tuple of algorithms (Init, Prove, Ver), defined as follows: (1) Algorithm Init takes as input the security parameter and outputs a common reference string crs ← Init(1 κ ); (2) Algorithm Prove takes as input a pair (x, w) such that (x, w) ∈ R and outputs an argument π; (3) Algorithm Ver takes as input a pair (x, π) and outputs a judgement in {0, 1}.
We require the following properties for N IZK [37, 11] .
Completeness: For every (x, w) ∈ R we have that
Multi-theorem zero-knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator Sim = (Sim 1 , Sim 2 ) such that, for all PPT adversaries A, the ensembles {Real(κ)} κ∈N and {Simu(κ)} κ∈N are computationally close, where
and Sim 2 (tk , (x, w)) outputs Sim 2 (tk , x) if (x, w) ∈ R, and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Simulation extractability: There exists a PPT algorithm Xtr = (Xtr 1 , Xtr 2 ) such that, for all PPT adversaries A, we have that
is negligible, where the list Q contains the successful pairs (x i , π i ) that A has queried to Sim 2 . We say that N IZK is true simulation-extractable if oracle Sim 2 (tk , x) is replaced by Sim 2 (tk , (x, w)) that outputs the same as Sim 2 (tk , x) if and only if (x, w) ∈ R (and outputs ⊥ otherwise).
One-More Unforgeability
A signature scheme is a triple of algorithms SS = (KGen, Sign, Verify) defined as follows: (1) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs a verification key/signing key pair (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ); (2) The signing algorithm takes as input a message m ∈ M and the signing key sk and outputs a signature σ ← Sign(sk , m); (3) The verification algorithm takes as input the verification key vk and a pair (m, σ) and outputs a bit Verify(vk , (m, σ)) ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by |σ| the size of a signature output via Sign(sk , ·).
Given a signature scheme SS, consider the following experiment Exp one−more SS,A (κ, , γ) running with a PPT adversary A and parametrized by the security parameter κ ∈ N, the leakage bound ∈ N and the slack parameter γ ∈ (0, 1]:
2. The adversary A can adaptively access oracles Sign(sk , ·) and O (sk , ·), where O (sk , f ) returns f (sk ). We let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the total information returned by O (with λ ≤ ), and we write Q for the set of messages A forwarded to the signing oracle.
3. A outputs n pairs (m 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , (m n , σ n ).
4. The experiment outputs 1 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Verify(vk , (m i , σ i )) = 1 and m i ∈ Q, for all i ∈ [n].
(b) The messages m 1 , . . . , m n are pairwise distinct.
(c) n ≥ λ/(γ|σ|) + 1.
Definition 1 (One-more unforgeability). We say that SS = (KGen, Sign, Verify) is ( , γ, ε)-one-more unforgeable if for every PPT adversary A we have that P[Exp
Whenever ε is negligible in the security parameter, we simply say that SS is ( , γ)-one-more unforgeable.
Remark 1 (on γ). The parameter γ specifies how close to optimal security SS is. In particular, in case γ = 1 one-more unforgeability requires that A cannot forge even a single signature more than what it could have leaked via leakage queries. As γ decreases, so does the strength of the signature scheme (the extreme case being γ = |M| −1 , where we have no security).
Note that the number of signatures the adversary has to forge depends on the length of the leakage he asks to see. In particular ( , γ)-one-more unforgeability implies standard unforgeability for any adversary asking no leakage (λ = 0).
Finally, we remark that for any γ ∈ (0, 1] we have that ( , γ)-one-more unforgeability implies ( , γ)-one-more unforgeability for all ≤ .
An Alternative Definition
Definition 1 may seem a weak security guarantee for a signature scheme, as an adversary is able to forge a certain number of signatures. If the messages to forge could be chosen at will at any time, this would be a rather useless security guarantee. Here, we state a seemingly stronger flavour of one-more unforgeability where a simulator can look at the state of the adversary after he is done with leakage queries and output a set Q * ⊂ M, of size less than n, thought of as the messages corresponding to the forgeries leaked so far; now the adversary is successful if he can produce a forgery for a message of his choice not contained in Q * (and not already asked to the signing oracle). In a certain sense, we get a notion that is similar to the standard unforgeability notion, with the twist that the adversary can ask a few extra signing queries (via leakage queries, though).
Given a signature scheme SS, consider the experiment Exp poly−sim−one−more SS,A,S (κ, , γ) below, running with a PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a PPT simulator S and parametrized by the security parameter κ ∈ N, the leakage bound ∈ N and the slack parameter γ ∈ (0, 1]:
1. Compute (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ) and give vk to A.
2. The adversary A 1 can adaptively access oracles Sign(sk , ·) and O (sk , ·), where O (sk , f ) returns f (sk ). We let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the total information returned by O (with λ ≤ ), and we write Q for the set of messages A 1 forwarded to the signing oracle.
3. Let st be the state of A 1 at the end of step 2 above, i.e., all his inputs, all his random choices, and all replies from the oracles. The simulator is given st and outputs Q * ← S(1 κ , vk , st) such that Q * ⊂ M and |Q * | ≤ λ/(γ|σ|) .
4.
A 2 is given Q * and st and outputs a forgery (m * , σ * ).
5. The experiment outputs 1 if and only if Verify(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * .
Definition 2 (Poly-constrained one-more unforgeability). We say that SS = (KGen, Sign, Verify) is ( , γ, ε)-poly-constrained one-more unforgeable if for every PPT adversary A there exists a PPT simulator S such that P[Exp
Whenever ε is negligible in the security parameter, we simply say that SS is ( , γ)-poly-constrained one-more unforgeable.
Yet Another Alternative Definition
Definition 2 requires that Q * can be computed in poly-time, effectively requiring that the adversary knows the small set of forgeries he leaked. In most applications we are aware of, it seems, however, enough that such a small set exists. And, there seems to be a difference between these notions. Consider an adversary who leaks a few values of the form
, but until it is given m i it does not know the set of messages it can forge signatures on, at least it would be hard to compute this set efficiently in a black-box manner. We formulate a security notion which still considers leakage of a few such "unknown" σ i as benign. We simply restate Definition 2, but we now allow S unbounded computing time. We can massage this relaxed definition a bit to get a simpler, equivalent definition. Consider the following generic simulator S min (1 κ , vk , st): it iterates over all Q * ⊂ M with |Q * | ≤ λ/(γ|σ|) and computes the probability p Q * that A 2 (Q * , st) outputs (m * , σ * ) such that Verify(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * . It then outputs the Q * minimizing p Q * . It is clear that if for some adversary A there exists an unbounded simulator S fulfilling Definition 2 for A, then also S min will fulfil Definition 2 for A. Hence we can equivalently hardwire S min into the definition. If we at the same time use that the expected value of a random value over {0, 1} is equal to the probability that it is 1, we get the below more compact definition. Consider the following experiment Exp sim−one−more SS,A (κ, , γ):
1. Compute (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ) and give vk to A 1 .
3. Let st be the state of A 1 at the end of step 2 above.
Output
Definition 3 (Constrained one-more unforgeability). We say that SS = (KGen, Sign, Verify) is ( , γ, ε)-constrained one-more unforgeable if it holds that E[Exp sim−one−more SS,A (κ, , γ)] ≤ ε for every PPT adversary A, where the expected value is over the random choices used to generate (vk , sk ) and the random choices of A 1 . Whenever ε is negligible in the security parameter, we simply say that SS is ( , γ)-constrained one-more unforgeable.
Equivalence of two Definitions
We argue below that one-more unforgeability and constrained-one-more unforgeability are equivalent. It is clear that security under Definition 2 implies security under Definition 3. We conjecture that Definition 3 is strictly weaker than Definition 2. (κ, , γ) . When reading the description keep in mind that it is defined to work when E occurs.
1. Receive the verification key vk and initialize Q * = ∅. A 1 (1 κ , vk ) and simulate leakage queries and signature queries using oracles O (sk , ·) and Sign(sk , ·). Let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the overall information retrieved by A 1 .
Run
3. Define n := λ/(γ|σ|) + 1. Repeat the following steps, for i = 1, . . . , n:
(a) Run 8(log 2 (n) + κ)/ε copies of A 2 (1 κ , st, Q * ) in parallel. If any of the copies outputs (m * i , σ * i ) such that Verify(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * , then go to the next step, otherwise give up and terminate.
(b) Set Q * := Q * ∪ {m * i } for one of the forgeries from above.
Assume that E occurs. Then the probability that any copy A 2 (1 κ , st, Q * ) in Step 1 outputs (m * i , σ * i ) such that Verify(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q∪Q * is ≥ ε/2. Hence one of the copies will output such (m * i , σ * i ), except with probability 2 − log 2 (n)−κ , by construction. Thus, by a union bound, the probability that A gives up in any of the iterations is at most n · 2 − log 2 (n)−κ = 2 −κ .
Clearly, when A does not give up in any of the iterations, we have that Exp
for infinitely many values of κ. This concludes the proof as A is PPT.
Next, we turn to the proof that Definition 3 implies Definition 1. By contradiction assume that there is an adversary A breaking ( , γ, ε)-one-more unforgeability of SS; we build an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) breaking constrained-one-more unforgeability. Adversary A runs in experiment Exp sim−one−more SS,A (κ, , γ) and works as follows:
1. Receive the verification key vk and forward it to A 1 .
2. Answer leakage queries and signature queries from A 1 using oracles O (sk , ·) and Sign(sk , ·).
Let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the overall information retrieved by A 1 .
3. Upon input a challenge Q * , run A 2 (Q * , st), where st is the state of A 1 after the above step, to produce forgeries (m 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , (m n , σ n ).
4. Choose j such that m j ∈ Q * and output (m j , σ j ).
For the analysis, note that clearly A runs in polynomial time. Provided that A is successful, there always exists a pair (m j , σ j ) (amongst the forgeries returned by A) such that (m j , σ j ) ∈ Q * . This is because |Q * | ≤ n − 1, whereas A outputs n forgeries such that the messages (m 1 , . . . , m n ) are pairwise distinct. Let r 1 denote the random choices of A 1 . Let I(vk, m * , σ * , Q, Q * ) be an index variable which is 1 if Verify(vk , (m * , σ * )) = 1 and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * , and 0 otherwise. Let Exp poly−sim−one−more SS,A (vk,sk,r 1 ),S (κ, , γ) denote the game from Definition 2 run with the fixed key pair (vk, sk) and fixed randomness r 1 for A 1 . Then 
Construction
We give a construction of a one-more unforgeable signature scheme (cf. Definition 1) based on the following building blocks:
• A non-interactive zero knowledge argument of knowledge system N IZK = (Init, Prove, Ver).
• A perfectly hiding and computationally binding, linearly homomorphic 6 commitment scheme COM = (Setup, Commit), with message and randomness space equal to a finite field F.
Our scheme SS = (KGen, Sign, Verify) has message space equal to F and is described below: 
Note that both valuesm,r can be computed efficiently as a function of the signing key (δ, r) and the message to be signed. Using crs as common reference string, generate a NIZK argument π that (pk , d i=0 (com i ) m i ) ∈ L R , the language generated by the above relation R. Output σ = π.
Verification. Given a pair (m, σ), parse σ as σ = π and compute com * = d i=0 (com i ) m i . Output the same as Ver(crs, π, (pk , com * )).
Let us first argue that the signature scheme satisfies the correctness property. This follows from the fact that COM is linearly homomorphic (cf. Section 2.2):
We prove the following result:
Theorem 2. Assume that COM is perfectly hiding and computationally binding, and that N IZK is a NIZK argument of knowledge system for relation R. Then the scheme SS described above is ( , γ)-onemore unforgeable, as long as = d log |F| and γ = log |F| |σ| .
Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem we will rely on the following property of any perfectly hiding commitment scheme COM = (Setup, Commit). Define the following experiment Exp guess COM,A (κ, , d), featuring an unbounded adversary A:
1. Run pk ← Setup(1 κ ) and sample x 1 , . . . , x d ∈ M uniformly at random. Compute com i = Commit(pk , x i ; r i ) and give
2. The adversary can access adaptively oracle O (s, ·). Let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the overall information retrieved by A (with λ ≤ ).
3.
The adversary can open a subset of size t of (x 1 , . . . ,
) are forwarded to A.
The experiment returns 1 if A outputs the remaining values
Lemma 2. Let COM = (Setup, Commit) be a perfectly hiding commitment scheme with message space M. Then for every computationally unbounded adversary A we have that
Proof. Since COM is perfectly hiding, we have that for all messages x 0 , x 1 ∈ M the distributions Commit(pk , x 0 ) and Commit(pk , x 1 ) are identical. This in particular implies that a commitment to x reveals no information about x itself, i.e., if X is uniform over M then H ∞ (X|Commit(pk , X; R)) = log |M|.
Let A be an adversary playing Exp guess COM,A (κ, ) and let X be the distribution induced by choosing d random elements (x 1 , . . . , x d ) in M. By the above argument, the perfectly hiding property implies that
Denote now with Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ the random variable corresponding to the information leaked by the adversary in a run of the experiment. By applying Lemma 1 (cf. Section 2.1), we conclude
Finally, denote with I ⊂ {1, . . . , d} the set chosen by A in the last step of the experiment, with |I| = t. The adversary is given {x i , r i } i∈I . Since the values {r i } i∈I are completely independent from {x i } i∈[d]\I , the average min-entropy of X conditioned on the final view of A at the end of the experiment satisfies:
which clearly implies the theorem (by definition of average min-entropy).
We now prove Theorem 2. Let A be a PPT machine running in experiment Exp one−more SS,A (κ, , γ). We recall how the experiment is held for our scheme SS.
1. The signing key sk = (δ, r) and the verification key vk = (pk , {com i } d i=0 ) are computed. In particular, pk ← Setup(1 κ ) and crs ← Init(1 κ ).
2. The adversary A is given vk and can access oracles Sign(sk , ·) and O (sk , ·).
• The signing oracle Sign(sk , m) computesm
with an argument π that (pk , com * ) ∈ L R for com * = Commit(m;r); hence, it returns σ = π.
• The leakage oracle O (sk , f ) returns f (sk ). (m 1 , π 1 ) , . . . , (m n , π n ). The proof proceeds by a series of games.
A outputs n pairs
Game 0 . This is the real experiment, as described above.
Game 1 . This game is identical to Game 0 , but we replace the Init algorithm with (crs, tk ) ← Sim 1 (1 κ ).
Moreover, each time a signing query for message m is asked, we simulate the argument by running π ← Sim 2 (tk , (pk , com * )). Everything else remains the same.
By a standard argument, the multi-theorem zero-knowledge property of the argument system implies that P [A wins Game 0 ] is negligibly close to P [A wins Game 1 ].
Game 2 . This game is identical to Game 1 , but the common reference string is sampled as (crs, tk , xk ) ← Xtr 1 (1 κ ) and before outputting 1 we check that all arguments contained in A's forgeries can be extracted via Xtr 2 (xk , ·).
By a standard argument, (true) simulation extractability of N IZK implies that P [A wins Game 1 ] is negligibly close to P [A wins Game 2 ]. Now, we show that P [A wins Game 2 ] is negligible which proves the theorem. Define the following event Bad in Game 2 : The event occurs whenever for at least one of the forgeries (m j , σ j ) returned by
. In other words, there exists a valid pair (m j , σ j ) for which the extracted valuem j is not the evaluation of m j through the polynomial δ(X) having δ as coefficients. We write
where the last inequality comes from the two claims below.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that P A wins Game 2 ∧ Bad > 2 λ /|F| n . We build a PPT reduction B (running A) which wins the game of experiment Exp Run (crs, tk , xk ) ← Xtr 1 (1 κ ) and give vk := (crs, pk , {com i } d i=0 ) to A.
2. Whenever A asks a leakage query f to O ((δ, r), ·), forward the same query to O (s, ·) (where s = (δ, r)). Give to A the same value returned by O (s).
3. Whenever A asks a signing query m to Sign(sk , ·), answer as follows. Simulate an argument π ← Sim(tk , (pk , com * )) where . . .
where each of the values y i is computed from known values as
6. Output (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ).
Note that B perfectly simulates the environment for A in Game 2 . The choice of the parameters γ = log |F|/|σ| and = d log |F| (as in the theorem statement), ensures that 1 ≤ n ≤ d + 1. In particular, the total number of field elements known by B is at most 
A Concrete Instantiation
In this section we show how to instantiate our signature scheme, reducing security to the DLIN assumption [5] . For each of the building blocks we present an instantiation and concrete parameters.
In the following let G be a cyclic group of order a prime number q. Before introducing our concrete construction, let us recall the DLIN assumption: Definition 4. The DLIN assumption states that for any PPT algorithm A it holds that
where g, g 1 , g 2 ← G and a, b, c ← F q .
COM : We use Pedersen commitments. The setup algorithm Setup outputs public parameters pk = (h 1 , h 2 ), where h 1 is a generator for G and h 2 = h a 1 for a random a ∈ F q . The commitment to an element m ∈ F q using randomness r ← F q is computed as com = Commit(pk , m; r) := h m 1 · h r 2 . Whenever we want to open the commitment, we reveal (m, r).
Note that Pedersen commitment is linearly homomorphic: given com 1 = Commit(m 1 ; r 1 ) and com 2 = Commit(m 2 ; r 2 ) it holds that
Moreover, for all constants c ∈ F q we have that com c = h c·m
N IZK : Recall that our relation is as follows:
When using Pedersen commitment, we get
Thus, we can reduce the proof of knowledge of an opening for com * to the proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm. Groth [19] gives a simulation-extractable NIZK for proving knowledge of discrete logarithms of a group element. We remark that the length of a proof is constant, and in particular independent of the degree d of the polynomial.
Alternatively, as true simulation-extractability is sufficient for our construction, one could instantiate the NIZK using the transformation of [11] , which requires a standard (non-simulationextractable) NIZK and a labeled CCA-secure encryption scheme.
Application to Leaky Identification
We show how to apply one-more unforgeability to the context of (leaky) identification protocols. In a public key identification scheme a prover with public key vk attempts to prove its identity to a verifier holding vk . More formally, an identification scheme ID = (PGen, KGen, P, V) consists of four PPT algorithms described as follows: (1) The parameters generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter and outputs public parameters params ← PGen(1 κ ), shared by all users. 7 (2) The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter and outputs a verification key/secret key pair (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ). (3) P and V are probabilistic Turing machines interacting in a protocol (P(sk ) V)(vk ); at the end of the execution V outputs a judgment d ∈ {0, 1}, where d = 1 means that the identification was successful. 7 In what follows all algorithms take as input params, but we omit to explicitly write this for ease of notation.
Following [1] , we define a leaky variant of the standard notion of active security, where an adversary, in a first phase, is given black-box access to the honest prover, and in a second stage is given one shot to convince the verifier. In the leaky case, during the first phase, the adversary can also access adaptively a leakage oracle O (sk ). More formally, given an identification scheme ID, consider the following experiment Exp active ID,A (κ, ) running with a PPT adversary A and parametrized by the security parameter κ ∈ N and the leakage bound ∈ N:
1. Run params ← PGen(1 κ ), compute (vk , sk ) ← KGen(1 κ ) and give (params, vk ) to A.
2. The adversary A is given black-box access to the prover P(sk ); in particular A can play the role of the verifier in polynomially many interactions with the prover (P(sk ) A)(vk ).
3. The adversary A can access adaptively oracle O (sk , ·). We let Λ ∈ {0, 1} λ be the total information returned by O (with λ ≤ ).
4. The adversary A loses access to all oracles and plays the role of the prover in an execution with an honest verifier (A V)(vk ), resulting in a bit d ∈ {0, 1}.
5. The experiment outputs 1 if and only if d = 1.
Definition 5. We say that ID is actively -secure under pre-impersonation attacks with leakage, if for all PPT adversaries A we have that P Exp active ID,A (κ, ) = 1 is negligible in the security parameter κ.
Consider the following standard construction (see [2] ) of an identification scheme ID from a signature scheme SS = (KGen , Sign, Verify).
• Parameters generation. Algorithm PGen samples the public parameters params for the signature schemes (if any).
• Key Generation. Algorithm KGen runs the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme, obtaining (vk , sk ) ← KGen (1 κ ).
• Identification protocol. The interaction (P(sk ) V)(vk ) is depicted in Figure 1 .
Prover P(vk , sk ) Verifier V(vk ) Figure 1: Two-round identification using a signature scheme SS with message space M As shown in [2] , the protocol of Figure 1 is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks provided that SS is existentially unforgeable. The theorem below states that the same protocol is also actively secure under pre-impersonation attacks with leakage, provided that SS is one-more unforgeable.
Theorem 3. Assume that SS is ( , γ)-constrained-one-more unforgeable. Then the scheme ID from Figure 1 is actively -secure under pre-impersonation attacks with leakage.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists an adversary A breaking security of the identification scheme with probability ε = 1/poly(κ) for infinitely many κ. We construct a PPT adversary B breaking constrained-one-more unforgeability of SS with non-negligible advantage. Adversary B runs in experiment Exp sim−one−more SS,B (κ, , γ) and is described below:
1. Receive the public parameters params and the verification key vk for SS and run A(params, vk ).
Whenever
A requires access to the prover P by sending a challenge m ∈ M, forward this value to the signing oracle Sign(sk , ·) and reply back with the corresponding signature σ. Let Q be the set of all challenges submitted by A.
3. Whenever A asks a leakage query, forward this query to O (sk ) and return to A the same value received from this oracle.
4. Whenever A is ready to start the impersonation phase, receive the challenge Q * from the game Exp sim−one−more SS,B
(κ, , γ), and then choose a random message m * ∈ M and send it to A obtaining a signature σ * .
5. Output (m * , σ * ) as a reply to the challenge Q * .
Notice that B's simulation of the environment for A is perfect, as leakage queries and the access to the prover are exactly the same as in the experiment Exp active ID,A (κ, ). Moreover, since the message m * in the impersonation stage is chosen at random from M, also the simulation of this phase has the right distribution and in particular the forgery (m * , σ * ) will be valid with probability ε.
It remains to compute the probability that B is successful. Observe that B is successful whenever (m * , σ * ) is valid and m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * . Also, note that m * is independent from Q * , so in particular P [m * ∈ Q * ] ≤ |Q * |/|M|. Let Good be event that m * ∈ Q ∪ Q * . We have,
where the last inequality uses the fact that q := |Q| and |Q * | ≤ n−1. As B's advantage is non-negligible we get a contradiction, concluding the proof.
